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Abstract 
 
This article examines the cultural-based critiques of the international human rights paradigm 
generally and children’s rights in particular, with specific reference to Africa. In this regard, the 
paper attempts to identify gaps in the analyses of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of 
the Child. Towards that end, the paper proceeds in three parts. In the first section, it situates the 
discussion within the general framework of children’s rights at international law. In the next 
section, it turns to an examination of the culture-based critiques of the idea of universal rights. 
Finally, in the fourth and fifth sections, it analyses the documents and literature that focus on the 
rights and welfare of the child. In the concluding section, the author raises several important 
questions regarding the propriety of this special category of human rights in the African context. 
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I. Introduction 
 
The preamble to the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (‘the African 
Children’s Charter’ or ‘the Charter’)1 makes two important statements regarding the 
instrument’s conception of the rights and welfare of the child. Firstly, it identifies the 
Charter’s foundation as the principles of the international law on the rights and welfare 
of the child as contained in the declarations, conventions and other instruments of the 
Organisation of African Unity and the United Nations.2 Significantly, the Charter 
specifically mentions the Convention on the Rights of the Child (‘the Convention’ or ‘the 
CRC’),3 and the Declaration on the Rights and Welfare of the African Child (‘the African 
Children’s Declaration’).4 Secondly, the Charter charges that the concept of the rights 
and welfare of the child should be inspired and characterised by the virtues of African 
cultural heritage, historical background and the values of the African civilisation. In 
other words, the Charter requires that the rights and welfare of the child, which are 
derived from universal sources, must be alive to the reality of African children.  
Given the Charter’s attempts to act as a bridge between international law and 
local observation, it ought to be the pre-eminent authority on children’s rights in Africa. 
However, analysis on the rights and welfare of the child that is based on the Charter is 
still very limited. In this article, I survey existing analysis on the international law on the 
rights of the child and analyse the cultural-based critiques of the international human 
rights paradigm generally and children’s rights in particular with the explicit purpose of 
identifying gaps in the analysis towards which further Charter-based contribution may 
be made. Thus, in the following section of the article, I present an introduction to the 
general structure of children’s rights at international law. This is followed, in section 3, 
by an examination of the culture-based critiques of the idea of universal rights. Sections 
4 and 5 complement the above by offering an analysis of documents and literature that 
focus on the rights and welfare of the child. 
 
II. The structural basis of children’s rights at international law 
 
Efforts to make provision for a catalogue of children’s rights or entitlements at the 
international level may be traced back to 1924 when the fifth Assembly of the League of 
Nations adopted the Declaration of the Rights of the Child (‘the 1924 Declaration’ or ‘the 
Declaration’).5 The 1924 Declaration, which was also known as the Declaration of 
Geneva,  proclaimed that ‘mankind owes to the child the best it has to give’; a message 
that was subsequently to underline the 1959 Declaration on the Rights of the Child (‘the 
                                                 
1  African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, adopted July 1990 (entered into force 29 
November 1999) OAU Doc.CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990). 
2  African Children’s Charter, preamble para 8. 
3  Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted 20 November 1989 (entered into force 2 
September 1990) GA Res. 44/25 (1989), UN Doc. A/RES/44/25 (1989). Text also available in 28 
International Legal Materials (1989) 1448 and 29 ILM (1990) 1340. 
4  Declaration on the Rights and Welfare of the African Child AHG/St. 4 (XVI) Rev. 1 1979. Text also 
available at <www.chr.upac.za/hr_docs/african/docs/ahsg/ahsg36.doc> (accessed 12 April 
2009). 
5  Declaration of the Rights of the Child League of Nations Official Journal (1924); Records of the 
Fifth Assembly. Supplement no. 23. See generally D Hodgson ‘The historical development and 
‘internationalisation’ of the children’s rights movement’ (1992) AJFL p 25. 
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1959 Declaration’)6; the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child (‘the Convention’ or 
‘the CRC’).7  as well as the African Children’s Charter. In particular, the 1924 Declaration 
set out five principles aimed at fulfilling the rights of children. The first principle 
provided that ‘[t]he child must be given the means requisite for its normal development, 
both materially and spiritually.’ The second provided that ‘[t]he child that is hungry 
must be fed; the child that is sick must be nursed…’ The third principle espoused an 
element of what has come to be commonly as the ‘children first principle’. It declared 
that ‘[t]he child must be the first to receive relief in times of distress.’ Principles four 
stated that the child must be protected from all forms of exploitation whilst the fifth 
principle called on states to inculcate in children a spirit of service towards fellow man. 
The 1924 Declaration, however, was never intended to create binding obligations on 
states and corresponding legal rights for children. Although it was termed a Declaration 
of the Rights of the Child, the instrument emphasised the duties that men and women 
had in ensuring that mankind gave children the best it had got to give. In other words, 
children were regarded as recipients of welfare rather than holders of specific rights. 
Despite this shortcoming, the 1924 Declaration is important in the development 
of the current children’s rights framework in several ways. Firstly, it debunks the notion 
that the international rights of the child are a recent development in international 
human rights law. The League of Nations initiative took place well before efforts to 
codify the universal rights of all people. The Declaration also provides the groundwork 
for the proposition that the welfare of children could best be protected by the protection 
of their rights;8 a proposition that has been borne out by the CRC and the African 
Children’s Charter. Finally, the Declaration, by espousing a mixture political, social and 
economic aspirations; renders credence to the principle that asserts the indivisibility of 
rights along civil and political, on the one hand; and economic, social and cultural on the 
other. 
A further important step in the protection of the rights and welfare of the child 
was taken when the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the 1959 
Declaration. The Declaration is a longer document consisting of a preamble and ten 
principles. The preamble to the Declaration, which makes a reference to the United 
Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, calls upon 
governments to implement its provisions through ‘legislative and other measures 
progressively taken.’ The preamble reaffirms the 1924 Declaration’s pledge that 
‘mankind owes to the child the best it has to give’ and goes on to place unequivocal 
duties on local authorities and voluntary organisations to work towards the observance 
of the rights of children. Despite the focus on the rights of children and the 
corresponding duties on states, some of the 1959 Declaration’s principles seem 
inconsistent with the idea of establishing legal rights. For example, principle 6 promotes 
what may now be considered an inappropriate view of the respective roles of fathers and 
mothers in a child’s life. The principle states, among other things, that ‘a child of tender 
                                                 
6  Declaration on the Rights of the Child, G.A. res. 1386 (XIV), 14 U.N. GAOR Supp (No. 16) at 19, 
U.N. Doc. A/4354 (1959). 
7  Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted 20 November 1989 (entered into force 2 
September 1990) GA Res. 44/25 (1989), UN Doc. A/RES/44/25 (1989). Text also available in 
(1989) 28 ILM 1448 and (1990) 29 ILM 1340. 
8  G van Bueren The International Law on the Rights of the Child (Dordrecht, Boston, & London, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995) 8.  
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years shall not, save in exceptional circumstances be separated from his mother.’ This 
view would not pass muster in the current international human rights framework as it 
promotes a stereotypical view of mothers that hinges on discrimination. Similarly, the 
declaration in principle 6 that a child needs ‘love and understanding’; and that children 
should grow in an atmosphere of ‘affection and of moral and material security’ would 
now be considered too vague to raise any legal obligations. 
However, apart from these shortcomings, the 1959 Declaration represents ‘the 
first serious attempt to describe in a reasonably detailed manner’9 a catalogue of the 
rights of the child. In accordance with the Declaration, a child is entitled to a name and 
nationality,10 to adequate nutrition, housing, recreation and medical services.11 It also 
calls upon states to make special provision for the needs of physically, mentally, and 
socially handicapped children;12 as well as those children lacking family support.13 The 
Declaration also guarantees the child the right to education, the right to play and 
recreation,14 and the right to be protected from neglect15 and hazardous employment.16 
More importantly, the 1959 Declaration contained a general non-discrimination clause17 
and was the first international instrument to enshrine the principle that children are 
entitled to ‘special protection’ and that such protection must be implemented by 
reference to ‘the best interests of the child’ which ‘shall be a paramount consideration.’18 
Although the 1959 Declaration was a non-binding resolution of the General 
Assembly, its statement on the rights and welfare of the child set the foundation for 
subsequent development of the corpus of child law at the international level. It marked a 
break with the prior conception of children as beneficiaries of charity and developed the 
child as a subject of international law with the ability to enjoy the benefits of specific 
rights and freedoms.  Indeed, in 1979, twenty years after adopting the Declaration, the 
General Assembly noted that: 
 
[T]he principles of the Declaration have played a significant part in the 
promotion of the rights of children in the entire world as well as in shaping 
various forms of international cooperation in this sphere.19 
 
Thus, it is not surprising that the 1959 Declaration’s principles found their way into the 
next international statement on the rights and welfare of the child: the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child. The first draft of the Convention that was submitted by Poland 
to the Commission on Human Rights in 1978 in many respects resembled the 1959 
Declaration. This draft was adopted by the Commission’s open-ended Working Group 
on the Draft Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1979. After a decade of discussion 
and refinement, the Working Group adopted its final report on 21 January 1989 and 
                                                 
9  Jane Fortin Children’s Rights and the Developing Law (2nd edn London, LexisNexis, 2003) 35. 
10  1959 Declaration, principle 3. 
11  1959 Declaration, principle 4 
12  1959 Declaration, principle 5. 
13  1959 Declaration, principle 6. 
14  1959 Declaration, principle 7. 
15  1959 Declaration, principle 9 
16  As above. 
17  1959 Declaration, principle 2. 
18  As above. 
19  UN GAOR, 33rd Sess., UN Doc. A/33/45. 
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forwarded the report to the Commission on Human Rights for consideration and 
transmission to the General Assembly. The Convention was adopted unanimously by the 
General Assembly on 20 November 1989 and quickly came into force on 2 September 
1990. 
The Convention which applies to ‘every human being below the age of eighteen 
years’,20 contains 54 articles, 40 of which makes provision for substantive rights ranging 
from civil and political to economic, social and cultural rights. It includes typical civil 
and political rights such as protection from discrimination,21 right to life,22 right to name 
and nationality,23 freedom of expression,24 religion,25 association and assembly,26 and 
the right to privacy.27 Amongst the economic, social and cultural rights are the rights to 
health,28 social security,29 education,30 and the right to play.31 Additionally, the CRC has 
been further augmented by the adoption of two optional protocols: the Optional 
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in 
armed conflict32 and the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography.33  In a nutshell, the 
CRC is a very comprehensive treaty that makes provision for almost every aspect of a 
child’s life. It may rightly be described as forming the core of the international law on 
the rights of the child.34 
Given the extensive scope of the Convention, it is useful for explanatory and 
analytical purposes to classify the rights into categories.35 In this regard, Thomas 
Hammaberg has suggested that the Convention may be said to be concerned with the 
four ‘P’s:36 the participation of children in decisions affecting them; the protection of 
children from all forms of discrimination; the prevention of harm to children; and the 
provision of assistance for their basic needs. All these ‘P’s’ are equally important and 
thus implementation efforts cannot be skewed in favour of one aspect when efforts in 
                                                 
20  Unless the age of majority is reached earlier. See CRC, art. 1. 
21  CRC, art. 2. 
22  CRC, art. 6. 
23  CRC, art. 7 
24  CRC, art. 13. 
25  CRC, art. 14. 
26  CRC, art. 15. 
27  CRC, art. 16. 
28  CRC, art. 24. 
29  CRC, art. 26. 
30  CRC, art.  29. 
31  CRC, art. 31. 
32  Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in 
armed conflict, G.A. Res. 54/263, Annex I, 54 U.N. GAOR Supp (No. 49) at 7, U.N. Doc. A/54/49, 
Vol. III (2000), entered into force February 12,2002. The text is also available at 
<http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/6/protocolchild.htm> (accessed on 22 April 2009). 
33  Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child 
prostitution and child pornography, G.A. Res. 54/263, Annex II, 54 U.N. GAOR Supp (No. 49) at 
6, U.N. Doc. A/54/49, Vol. III (2000), entered into force January 18, 2002. The text is also 
available at <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/dopchild.htm> (accessed on 22 April 2009).  
34  Jane Fortin describes it as ‘the touchstone for children’s rights throughout the world.’ See Jane 
Fortin (n 9) 49. 
35  Jane Fortin ( n 9) 38. 
36  Thomas Hammaberg ‘The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child-and how to make it work’ 
(1990) 12 HRQ 97. See also G van Bueren (n 8) 15. 
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the other areas are lagging behind.37 The Committee on the Rights of the Child, which is 
tasked with monitoring the implementation of the CRC by states parties has also 
emphasised on the interrelated nature of its provisions. Nevertheless, the Committee 
has elevated non-discrimination,38 the child’s best interests,39 survival and 
development40 and principle on participation into general principles.41 Consequently, 
any consideration of actions, policies or interventions relating to children must be 
gauged with reference to these four cross-cutting principles.42  
Since it was adopted by the General Assembly in November of 1989, the CRC has 
taken credit for several firsts. It was the longest and most comprehensive list of human 
rights created for a specific group. It entered into force in record time as the quickest 
ratified instrument of all human rights treaties; coming into force barely nine months 
after its adoption. It quickly became the most ratified human rights treaty in the world; 
with ratifications by all the world’s nations save for East Timor, Somalia and the United 
States of America.43 
However, the enthusiasm which greeted the adoption of the CRC must be 
tempered with the flurry of reservations, declarations and the accompanying objections 
that greeted these record ratifications. No less than 70 states parties have entered 
reservations or declarations, some of which attempt to subject the Convention under the 
various religious, cultural or traditional observations current in the concerned 
jurisdictions. Consequently, whist the ratification of the Convention en masse indicates 
a basic acceptance of the premise that the welfare of children may be best achieved by 
the promotion and protection of their rights; there is yet no universal consensus on the 
form that such protection should take. This struggle between universal ideas and the 
relevance of context are not peculiar to children’s rights but permeate throughout 
human rights discourse generally.  
 
III. Universal rights and the struggle for context 
 
In 1948, the international community adopted by consensus, the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (‘the UDHR’ or ‘the Declaration’)44 Almost sixty years down the road, 
it is still the pre-eminent document in the growing corpus of human rights 
instruments.45  The Declaration proclaims the universality of human rights by 
                                                 
37  G van Bueren (n 8) 15. 
38  CRC, art. 2. 
39  CRC, art. 3. 
40  CRC, art. 6 
41  See Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Fact Sheet No. 10 (Rev 1) ‘The rights of 
the child’ available at <http://www.unhcr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs10.htm (accessed 22 December 
2006). 
42  T Kaime ‘The Convention on the Rights of the Child and the cultural legitimacy of children’s 
rights in Africa: Some reflections’ (2005) 5 Afr Hum Rts L J 221 at 228-9. 
43  As of 26 September 2006, the CRC had 192 states parties. See 
<http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratification/11.htm#N40> (accessed on 22 April 
2009). 
44  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted 10 December 1948, G.A.Res 217A, UN GAOR, 
3rd sess., at 71, UN Doc A/810 (1948). 
45  J Donnelly ‘The Universal Declaration model of human rights: A liberal defense’ (2001) available 
at <http://www.du.edu/humanrights/workingpapers/papers/12-donnelly> (accessed on 22 April 
2009) noting that the global human rights regime is rooted in the Universal Declaration. See also 
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proclaiming that it is ‘a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all 
nations.’46 Consequently, since the prescriptions of the Declaration apply to every 
human being regardless of who or where they are, human rights are often commonly 
spoken of as universal rights.47 As Donnelly puts it, human rights are ‘general rights that 
arise from no special undertaking beyond membership in the human race. To have 
human rights, one does not have to be anything other than be born a human being.’48 
Such rights are, therefore, an inherent part of one’s humanity and the claim of universal 
rights is that all human beings ought to be treated in the ways prescribed by the UDHR 
everywhere.49 Howard, who is in many respects Donnelly’s ideological and 
philosophical counterpart, proffers the following definition: 
 
Human rights are rights that all human beings are entitled to, merely by 
virtue of being human. Such rights do not have to be earned, nor are they 
dependent on any particular social status.50 
 
This conception of human rights as entitlements that belong to the individual is 
explicitly liberal.51 It originated out of the specific historic context of western Europe. 
Although the foundations of human rights thought may be traced to earlier thinkers and 
writers, the concept was given a particularly clear and forceful articulation in the 
writings of 18th century thinker, John Locke through his Treatise on government.52 
Thus, taking their cue from their liberal origins, universalists maintain that every person 
has comprehensive and equal rights, as an individual living within human society. 
Whilst universalists do not deny that people from different cultures or backgrounds may 
be different, they insist that individual sameness, or similarity, among human beings 
should prevail over cultural difference when t comes to human rights.53 
Those taking a relativist position on the question of human rights reject the above 
notions of human rights as naïve, lacking empirical validity, ahistorical and worst of all 
culturally imperialistic.54 The relativists begin by asserting the empirical fact that 
historically, different societies have had different or no notions of rights. They also claim 
                                                                                                                                                             
M Glen Johnson & J Symmides The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A History of its 
Creation and Implementation, 1948-1998 (Paris, UNESCO Publishing 1998); G Alfredsson & A 
Eide (eds) The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A Common Standard of Achievement 
(The Hague, Boston, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1995). 
46  UDHR, preamble. 
47  See generally J Donnelly Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (Ithaca, Cornell 
University 1989) ch. 1and JW Nickel Making Sense of Human Rights: Philosophical Reflections 
on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Berkeley, University of California Press 1987). 
48  J Donnelly ‘Human rights and human dignity: An analytical critique of non-western conceptions 
of human rights’ (1982) 76 American Political Science Review p 303 at p 306. 
49  J Donnelly (n 45) at 1-3. 
50  R Howard ‘Universal human rights’ (2001) available at 
<http://www.chrf.ca/english/programmes-eng/files/ihrt/22nd-session/universal-hr.pdf> 
(accessed on 22 December 2006). 
51  Ibid at 1. 
52  See generally OM Ejidike ‘Human rights in the cultural traditions and social practice of the Igbo 
of south-eastern Nigeria’ (1999) 43 JAL 71. 
53  LS Bell, AJ Nathan & I Peleg ‘Introduction: Culture and human rights’ in LS Bell, AJ Nathan & I 
Peleg (eds)  Negotiating Culture and Human Rights (Columbia University Press, New York 2001) 
1 at 5. 
54  Ibid. 
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that individual rights are not God-given or self-evident as the universalists claim. 
Rather, they are a historical construct which developed in Europe in reaction to the 
social, political and economic development of those communities. Thus, argue the 
relativists, individual human rights are not universal but rather, particularistic western 
values masquerading as universal concepts. 
The debate between universalists and relativists highlights the complex and often 
arduous task of translating legal and ethical concepts of rights between two different 
cultures or normative systems. A plethora of anthropological literature illustrates a great 
many of the dilemmas that arise from encounters between different value systems.55 
However, despite the initial clamour against those challenging the liberal doctrine of the 
universality of individual human rights, increasing awareness has emerged slowly 
amongst scholars as to the prevalence of significant cultural variations in the protection 
of human rights.56 Many scholars have questioned the strict presumptions upon which 
human rights are based57 and have suggested that a great deal of flexibility must be 
incorporated when formulating conceptions of human rights across different cultures.58 
In this regard, Obemeyer observes:59 
 
It is increasingly recognised that while absolute universals cannot be 
found, it is possible, and indeed desirable, to seek common denominators 
across cultures, which in turn can be used to develop contextually relevant 
notions of [human] rights. 
 
The debate between universalists and relativists concerning the appropriateness of a 
western-inspired ideology for non-western societies has not escaped the notice of 
African and Africanist scholars. Amongst this group, a rich diversity of opinion exists. 
The position of some western-trained African jurists is often uncritical of the 
universalist argument and is itself entrenched within liberal thought. Shivji has gone so 
far to describe this strain of human rights discourse as being ‘less sophisticated than 
that of African social scientists.’60 As an example, Asante’s forceful argument on the 
applicability of human rights to African communities is reflective of this scholarly 
position. He emphatically argues:61 
 
I reject the notion that human rights concepts are peculiarly or even 
essentially bourgeois or western, and without relevance to Africans. Such 
notions confuse the articulation of the theoretical foundations of human 
rights with the ultimate objective of any philosophy of human rights. 
Human rights quite simply, are concerned with asserting and protecting 
human dignity, and they are ultimately based on a regard for the intrinsic 
                                                 
55  M Herskovitz ‘Statement on human rights’ (1947) 49 Amer. Anthrop. p 539. 
56  See A Pollis ‘Cultural relativism revisited: Through a state prism’ (1996) 18 HRQ 316 at 317. 
57  See M Obemeyer ‘A cross-cultural perspective on reproductive rights’ (1995) 17 HRQ 366 at 368. 
58  See generally Alison Dundes Renteln International Human Rights: Univeralism Versus 
Relativism (Newbury Park, California, London, Sage Publications 1990). 
59  M Obemeyer (n 57) 368. 
60  Issa G Shivji The Concept of Human Rights in Africa (Dakar, Codesria 1989) at 11. 
61  Asante quoted in H Hannum ‘The Butare colloquium on human rights and economic 
development in Francophone Africa: A summary and analysis’ (1979) 1 Universal Human Rights 
1 at 15 (see  fn 67). 
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worth of the individual. This is an eternal and universal phenomenon and 
it is also true to Nigerians and Malays as to Englishmen and Americans.  
 
Those who argue against this universalist critique of human rights in Africa advance a 
cultural specific alternative. They observe that human rights as conceived in the west are 
rejected in Africa precisely because their philosophical basis is not only different but 
indeed opposite. It is opined that whereas the liberal construct of human rights is 
premised on an autonomous and rational individual, the African worldview knows not 
of such individualism. Pollis affirms this contention when she asserts:62 
 
Whatever the diversity amongst third world countries in their traditional 
belief systems, individuals still perceive themselves in terms of their group 
identity. Who and what an individual is has been conceptualised in terms 
of the kinship system, the clan, the tribe, the village, whatever the specific 
cultural manifestations of the underlying prevailing worldview. 
 
Consequently, any theory of human rights must take into account this reality if it is to be 
of any use to Africans. In affirming Pollis’ reminder, it is sufficient to observe that a 
considerable number of African scholars argue against what Ejidike terms ‘cultural-
monopolist’ derivations of the origins of human rights.63 He instead advocates a 
cultural-universalist conception which he considers not only possible but also very 
necessary. He argues thus:64 
 
To arrogate the concept [of human rights] to some groups, cultures, and 
civilisations to the exclusion of others would be deleterious to the 
momentum toward universal consensus on human rights in at least two 
ways. It would harden or ossify divisive tendencies and provide 
ammunition for apologist justification of violations. 
 
Ibhawoh subscribes to this view but for a different reason. He suggests that one reality 
that has strengthened the need for the universalisation of human rights is the trend 
toward rapid globalisation in almost every sphere of human endeavour. He observes 
that:65 
 
The spread of the western model of the state to Africa and other parts of 
the developing world has given rise to the need for constitutional and 
other legal guarantees of human rights. Thus, the modern concept of 
human rights, admittedly a product of the west, is becoming equally 
relevant in other parts of the world. 
 
                                                 
62  A Pollis ‘Liberal, socialist and third world perspectives of human rights’ in P Schwab & A Pollis 
(eds) Toward a Human Rights Framework (New York, Praeger 1982) 1ff. 
63  OM Ejidike(n52) 71. 
64  Ibid. 
65  B Ibhawoh ‘Between culture and constitution: Evaluating the cultural legitimacy of human rights 
in the African state’ (2000) 22 HRQ 839. 
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Whilst acknowledging the relevance of universal norms, Ibhawoh nevertheless cautions 
against universalistic expositions of human rights in the construction of their protection. 
Instead, he argues for approaches which take into account and are enriched by the 
‘African cultural experience.’66  Aidoo attributes the absence of this Africanness to the 
fact that ‘original research in the area of human rights in Africa is scanty.’67 He decries 
the seeming preoccupation of scholars with human rights discourse at the formal level at 
the expense of considering civil society ‘where cultural traditions and customs impact 
negatively on specific rights.’68 Aidoo, therefore, emphasises the need for urgent 
research on such themes as the ‘cultural foundation of human rights’ amongst others, 
which in his view have not been sufficiently addressed by African scholars.  
In view of the above observations, it is vitally important that the literature and 
scholarship on children’s rights in Africa must seek to align itself with the realities of 
African children so that a firm ‘cultural foundation’ is established for this category of 
human rights. However, one aspect which almost all of these scholars omit to focus their 
attention are the source documents. It is critically important that not only scholarship 
has proper cultural foundations but also the core instruments protecting the rights of 
the child. 
 
IV. Documents affecting the rights and welfare of the African child 
 
As noted earlier in this discussion, international efforts to prescribe a catalogue of 
children’s rights may be traced back to the 1924 Declaration which was later followed by 
the 1959 Declaration. However, at the time when these documents promulgated, the 
majority of African states were still under colonial rule.69 The principles in these 
documents were arguably not intended to benefit children who found themselves under 
colonial rule despite the universalistic tones in which they were couched. 
Despite this gloomy background, when African states adopted the Declaration on 
the Rights and  Welfare of the African Child (‘the African Children’s Declaration’)70 in 
1979 at the sixteenth ordinary session of  the Assembly of Heads of Government of the 
Organisation of African Unity (‘the OAU’) in Liberia, Monrovia; they explicitly 
recognised the 1959 UN Declaration by declaring that member states of the OAU ‘should 
undertake or continue…efforts to renew the current legal codes and provisions relating 
to the rights of children, particularly by taking into account the 1959 UN Declaration.’ 
Thus, quite clearly the OAU subscribed to the ideals that the 1959 UN Declaration 
enunciated. At the same time, the African Children’s Declaration gave political force to 
an otherwise particularistic account of children’s rights which did not have an African 
cultural foundation.  
                                                 
66  Ibid. 
67  A Aidoo ‘Africa: Democracy without human rights?’ (1993) 15 HRQ 703 at 713.  
68  B Ibhawoh (n 65) 840. 
69  See generally L Muthoga ‘Analysis of international instruments for the protection of the rights of 
the child’ in Community Law Centre (ed) International Conference on the Rights of the Child: 
Papers and reports of a conference convened by the Community Law Centre (Cape Town, 
Community Law Centre 1992) 123. 
70  Declaration on the Rights and Welfare of the African Child AHG/St. 4 (XVI) Rev. 1 1979. Text also 
available at <www.chr.upac.za/hr_docs/african/docs/ahsg/ahsg36.doc> (accessed 12 April 
2009). 
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Further to that, the African Children’s Declaration took an unequivocal 
cognisance and gave support to the processes in the UN General Assembly with respect 
to the rights of the child. In particular, the Declaration mentioned UN General Assembly 
resolution 1/31/169 which proclaimed 1979 as the International Year of the Child (‘the 
IYC’).71 In this regard, the African Children’s Declaration called on all OAU member 
states to form permanent commissions or machineries bestowed with the necessary 
legal powers to assist in implementing the IYC.72  
Further still, the African Children’s Declaration grounded the conception and 
implementation of children’s rights within an African socio-political context by 
declaring that African children are inheritors and keepers of African cultural heritage 
and consequently called on member states to ensure that: 
 
…efforts should be made to preserve and develop African arts, language 
and culture and to stimulate the interest and appreciation of African 
children in the cultural heritage of their own countries and of Africa as a 
whole.73 
 
In other words, no conception of children’s rights should rob African children of their 
legacy, inheritance and inheritance as children of the continent. At the same time, the 
Declaration makes it clear that the recognition of cultural values should not assume 
primacy over the protection of children’s rights. Rather, the two paradigms should 
complement each other and help achieve the adequate protection of African children.74 
However, despite this strong acceptance of children’s rights by the OAU, the issue 
did not feature as emphatically in the subsequent statement on human rights by the 
organisation. The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (‘the African Human 
Rights Charter’ or ‘the African Charter’)75 which was adopted by the OAU in 1981 did not 
provide extensively for children’s rights. In the words of Viljoen, ‘children are only 
referred to on one occasion, as an afterthought, in the context of women’s rights’ in 
article 18(3) where the African Human Rights Charter enjoins states parties to 
‘ensure…the protection of the woman and child as stipulated in international 
declarations and conventions.’  
A debate ensued regarding whether by virtue of this provision, states parties to 
the African Human Rights Charter became legally bound by the provisions of the 1959 
UN Declaration and subsequent instruments that dealt with women’s or children’s 
rights76. Whilst some authors sought to give a generous interpretation to the article, it is 
difficult to see how states could become bound by these declarations or conventions 
without formally submitting to the prescribed ratification process of the concerned 
instruments. Indeed the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (‘the Vienna 
                                                 
71  African Children’s Declaration, preamble. 
72  African Children’s Declaration, para 1. 
73  African Children’s Declaration, para 10. 
74  African Children’s Charter, para 2. 
75  African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, adopted June 27, 1981 (entered into force 21 
October 1986) OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982). 
76  F Viljoen ‘Supra-national human rights instruments for the protection of children in Africa : the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the 
Child’ (1998) 31 The Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa p 199 at p 
205. 
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Convention’)77 which is considered the definitive statement on the law of treaties would 
not regard the situation envisaged under article 18(3) of the African Charter as 
envincing an intention to become legally bound by subsequent instruments.78 At best 
the provision could be considered as an expression of a political commitment to support 
the processes within the UN aimed towards securing children’s rights as opposed to an 
automatic ratification mechanism. This interpretation is confirmed by the fact that all of 
the 52 African countries that are bound by the CRC had to ratify the treaty in accordance 
with its provisions despite their ratification of the African Charter.79 
However, despite accepting the provisions of the CRC en masse, African states 
still sought to draft provisions of an instrument on the rights of the child which reflected 
African concerns. Hence the drafting of the African children’s Charter by a working 
group of African experts on the rights and welfare of the child.  
According to Muthoga, the idea to adopt an instrument on the rights of the 
African child ‘originated from a desire to address certain peculiarly African problems’ 
which had not been addressed by the CRC.80 Among other concerns; the peculiarities of 
the African situation omitted from the Convention were identified as the situation of 
children living under apartheid; disadvantages facing the African girl child; the African 
conception of the community’s responsibilities and duties; the role of the extended 
family in the upbringing of children; the use of children as soldiers; and problems of 
internal displacement arising from civil wars and internal insurrections.81 
Similarly, Wako attributes the drafting of the Charter to the value of regional 
arrangements per se as a moving force for positive change and in this case, as a tool for 
the enhanced protection of African children. In this regard, he mentions resolutions of 
the UN General Assembly and concludes that ‘each region, with its unique culture, 
traditions and history, is best placed to handle and resolve its human rights situation.’82 
In a nutshell, the appropriateness of the CRC to the African child was weighed and 
found somewhat wanting. The intention thus was to supplement or plug in the holes 
presented by the global instrument. 
Viljoen, however, attributes the African initiative to frustration with the UN 
process during the drafting of the CRC. He correctly observes that African nations were 
grossly underrepresented during the drafting process. He notes: 
 
African involvement in the drafting process was limited. Only three 
African states participated for at least five of the nine years that the 
working group took to draft the final proposal. This is the lowest 
percentage of all continents, contrasting sharply with west European (61% 
of the continental potential) and even Latin American (29%) participation 
over a similar period. 83 
                                                 
77  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, adopted 22 May 1969 (entered into force 27 January 
1980) 1155 UNTS 331.  
78  See Vienna Convention, arts 11-16. 
79  See CRC, arts 47 & 48. 
80  L Muthoga (n 69) 124. 
81  F Viljoen (n 76) 206 
82  SA Wako ‘Towards an African Charter on the Rights of the Child’, paper delivered at the 
Workshop on the Draft Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nairobi, 9-11 May 1988 at p (Paper 
on file with author). 
83  F Viljoen (n 76) 200. 
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Consequently, it was difficult to get on board in a forceful way issues that reflected the 
African cultural context. In other words, potentially divisive and emotive issues were 
omitted in the search for consensus between states from diverse backgrounds.84 Thus, 
although the CRC addressed every aspect of children’s lives, specific provisions on 
aspects peculiar to Africa fell victim to the overriding aim reaching a compromise and 
the African Children’s Charter was intended to fill that void in terms of African 
concerns. The Charter incorporates the universalist outlook of the CRC but at the same 
time clothes its conceptions within the ‘African cultural context.’ It is, therefore, a 
document with a cultural-universalist outlook and a perfect start point for the 
consideration and elucidation of children’s rights in Africa.  
Another useful document for analysing the rights and welfare of the child is the 
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women 
in Africa (‘the Women’s Protocol’ or ‘the Protocol’).85 The Women’s Protocol, which 
contains an extensive compendium of rights for women defines ‘woman’ as ‘persons of 
female gender, including girls.’86 Consequently, the Protocol provides another source of 
protection for African girl-children. However, the majority of the literature dealing with 
the rights and welfare of the African child is mostly based on the CRC and the African 
Children’s Charter is merely mentioned by the way. 
 
V. Literature on the rights and welfare of the African child 
 
The CRC is the principal normative framework relied on in most analyses relating to the 
rights of the child in Africa. Thus, most of the discussions in the secondary literature 
examine specific issues regarding children’s rights in Africa or within particular 
domestic jurisdictions in light of the standards propounded by the CRC. In these 
analyses, the African Children’s Charter does not feature prominently, if at all. For 
example, in Alston’s work relating to the best interests of the child and how the concept 
may be analysed, interpreted and implemented within various cultural contexts, out of 
the contributors dealing with the concept from an African perspective, only one makes 
reference to the African Children’s Charter.87 Similarly, in Ncube’s laudable work on the 
interaction between law, culture, tradition and children’s rights, only Ncube’s analysis88 
is based on the African Children’s Charter whilst the rest of the contributors adopt the 
CRC as the benchmark. 
The large volume of literature analysing the rights of children in Africa in terms 
of the CRC is necessary and perhaps inevitable for a number of reasons. Firstly, all 
African states, save for Somalia, have ratified the Convention. It is thus important to 
develop scholarship which critically investigates the implementation as well as the 
                                                 
84  Ibid. 
85  Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, 
adopted 13 September 2000 (entered into force 25 November 2005) CAB/LEG/66.6. 
86  Women’s Protocol, art 1(k). 
87  See B Rwezaura ‘The concept of the child’s best interests in the changing economic and social 
context of sub-Saharan Africa’ in P Alston (ed) Best Interests of the Child: Reconciling Culture 
and Human Rights (Oxford, Oxford University Press 1994) 80 at 83. 
88  W Ncube ‘The African cultural fingerprint? The changing concept of childhood’ in W Ncube (ed) 
Law, Culture, Tradition and Children’s Rights in Eastern and Southern Africa (Dartmouth, 
Aldgate 1998) 11. 
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implications of the Convention. Secondly, African states were slow in ratifying the 
African Children’s Charter after its adoption by the African Union (formerly the 
Organisation of African Union) on 11 July 1990 at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Thus, whilst 
commentators were marvelling at the speed and volume at which the Convention had 
been ratified by African states, the African Children’s Charter could lay claim to no such 
fame. It remained in the background, not influencing the discourse on children’s rights 
in Africa as it ought to have done.  
Ironically, the emphasis on the CRC makes it very difficult to avoid universalistic 
expositions of children’s rights and, therefore, poses one of the key obstacles to 
developing an appropriately distinctive African discourse on children’s rights. 
Consequently, investigations into how the virtues of African cultural heritage, historical 
background and the values of African civilisation shape the contours of protection for 
African children are hard to come by since these principles did not inspire the 
conception of children’s rights in the CRC.  
However, this state of affairs notwithstanding, some scholars have made 
contributions based on the African Children’s Charter itself. This motley collection of 
literature may be better described by its paucity than its depth of analysis. However, in a 
manner not unlike the contributions based on the CRC, most of the literature based on 
the African Children’s Charter assumes the cultural legitimacy of children’s rights within 
African communities.  As a result, the majority of the works are either abstract textual 
examinations of the relevant instruments or analyses of particular harmful practices 
which are inconsistent with the said instruments.  
Thus, Gose presents a comparative analysis of the African Children’s Charter with 
the CRC which concentrates on the differences between the wording of the Charter and 
the CRC.89 He painstakingly highlights the textual differences between the two 
documents and often comments on the implications that the differences may have in the 
interpretation of the Charter. His meticulousness is demonstrated when he observes 
that ‘…article 27 of the Charter contains flaws in relation to its numbering. The Charter’s 
provision is numbered as 27(1) while there is no other subsection in the article.’ This 
level of thoroughness is reflected in the entire work. However, he does not address the 
question of the Charter’s or the CRC’s relationship to the socio-political context of the 
African child. 
Another example of work that avoids engagement with the lived reality of African 
children is the contribution by Lloyd.90 In her article, she explicitly sets out to present a 
‘theoretical analysis’ of children’s rights in Africa and although her analysis proposes to 
discuss ‘the reality of children’s rights in Africa’; that reality is limited to the text of the 
African Children Charter and other documents within the African human rights system. 
Like Gose, she presents a wide-ranging critique of the substantive provisions of the 
Charter and makes comparisons between the African Children’s Charter and the CRC. 
This discussion is then rounded off by an examination of the monitoring and 
enforcement mechanisms envisaged by the Charter. However, the absence of context-
based analysis or material leads her to conclude that ‘[b]asically, before the adoption of 
                                                 
89  See generally Michael Gose The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child: An 
Assessment of the Legal value of its Substantive Provisions by Means of a Direct Comparison to 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child (Cape Town, Community Law Centre, 2002). 
90  Amanda Lloyd ‘A theoretical analysis of the reality of children’s rights in Africa: An introduction 
to the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child’ (2002) Afr Hum Rts L J 11. 
Heruntergeladen von Brill.com07/04/2020 08:06:59AM
via free access
The Foundations of Rights in the African Charter on the Rights of the Child Kaime 
 
-134- 
 
the African Children’s Charter, children had no voice, no specific rights or protection’;91 
a proposition which does not accurately describe the situation of children before the 
adoption of the Charter. She, however, correctly observes that as far as the African 
Children’s Charter is concerned, ‘[t]here is a lack of awareness…, and notable lack of 
academic debate.’92 
Similarly, Chirwa ‘critically discuss[es]  the merits and demerits of the African 
Children’s Charter.’93 He analyses some concepts and themes which are central to the  
African Children’s Charter such as obligations of states parties, non-discrimination, best 
interests principle, the child’s survival and development and others. Like Gose, Chirwa 
uses the CRC as the comparator for his analysis and points out the shortcomings or 
improvements that the Charter has over the CRC. He, however, omits to engage 
critically with the context of the rights and welfare of the African child.  
Thus, a significant part of the discourse on children’s rights in Africa has 
assumed that children’s rights are a legitimate enterprise within African societies. Such 
an approach not only erroneously expects international norms respecting children’s 
rights to override inconsistent cultural norms but also stifles the development of a 
conceptual framework for resolving the inevitable conflict between African traditional 
values and children’s rights.  
Some contributions though, attempt to avoid an abstract rendering of the 
Charter’s provisions and provide some background or context to their adoption or 
operation. For example Viljoen’s contribution, though generally presenting a textual 
analysis of the African Children’s Charter, adverts to some cultural justifications for the 
adoption of the Charter.94 He also attempts, albeit cursorily, to engage with the issues 
that make it necessary to have an African document on the rights of the child. The 
article, although providing a suitable context to the promulgation of and necessity for 
the African Children’s Charter, attempts to engage with too many issues and as a result 
does not deal with them in any sufficient depth. 
Thompson also combines a textual analysis with an examination, albeit very 
brief, of the implications of the African Children’s Charter on African family law.95  Her 
analysis, unlike those discussed above, does not focus on weighing the African 
document against the CRC but proceeds to examine the provisions of the Charter sui 
generis thereby affirming the African Children’s Charter’s position as a self-standing 
document.96 This analysis is followed by an examination of the position of African 
family law in the context of the protections prescribed by the African Children’s Charter. 
Her analysis, however, does not seek to investigate and resolve the profound questions 
associated with children’s rights and family relationships. She merely raises questions 
whose answers are left unstated thereby implying the need for further grounded 
research. Regrettably though, she calls for a normative break with cultural 
traditionalism in the protection of children’s rights and points to the African Children’s 
                                                 
91  Ibid. 
92  Ibid. 
93  DM Chirwa ‘The merits and demerits of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the 
Child’ (2002) 10 Intl J of Children’s Rts 157ff. 
94  F Viljoen ‘The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child’ in CJ Davel (ed) 
Introduction to Child Law in South Africa (Landsdowne, Juta, 2000) 214. 
95  Bankole Thompson ‘Africa’s charter on children's rights: A normative break with cultural 
traditionalism, (1992) 41 ICLQ 432. 
96  M Gose (n 89) 12-15. 
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Charter as evidence of such break.97 What is needed now are not normative breaks with 
tradition but an affirmation of traditionalism in the whole enterprise of children’s rights 
and the African Children’s Charter, far from affirming such break, calls for a prominent 
place for African values and civilisation in the conception of children’s rights.98 
 An additional recent resource that begins to clarify children’s rights in Africa by 
reference to the lived reality of African children is Ncube’s laudable collection of essays99 
which highlights practices and notions which are inconsistent with the African 
Children’s Charter and the CRC. One of Ncube’s contributions in the volume which is 
based on the African Children’s Charter calls for ‘African cultural fingerprinting’ in the 
conception and implementation of children’s rights in Africa.100 He emphasises the 
importance of local cultural context in giving substantive rights their meaning.101 He, 
therefore, calls for the need for research directed at ‘understanding the intersections and 
interfaces between children’s rights as conceived in the relevant human rights 
instruments and the cultural and social context of Africa.’102 The essays that follow his 
contribution attempt to address this critical need for contextualisation. However, the 
studies offer microanalyses of particular rights, contexts or domestic situations with the 
result that a sustained analytical framework is absent. There are, therefore, questions 
that still need to be investigated. 
 
VI. Emerging questions 
 
In this concluding section, I raise some of the questions that could stimulate research 
that is based on the African Children’s Charter. Recognising that the majority of the 
literature assumes the cultural legitimacy of children’s rights in Africa, there remain 
important questions regarding the appropriateness of this category of human rights in 
the African context. How has the debate regarding the universality or relativity of 
human rights shaped the conception of children’s rights? Is there a need for the African 
Children’s Charter? And if so, does it guarantee better or more efficacious protection for 
African children? 
In this regard, one must then consider in what ways the African Children’s 
Charter makes provision that is ideally suited to the African cultural context. Do the core 
concepts in the Charter bear or encourage African cultural fingerprinting? In what 
respects do they encourage the development of a distinctively African discourse on 
children’s rights?  
Obviously, a consideration of the core principles raises questions as to their 
implementation. How should this be achieved at the formal level? How about at the 
informal level? Is it possible to sustain the cultural context of the African Children’s 
Charter at this stage? What tools, agencies or strategies ought to be relied on during this 
process?  
In examining these questions, the I argue that researchers must adopt both socio-
legal as well as international law methods to present an understanding of the African 
                                                 
97  B Thompson (n 95) 433. 
98  African Children’s Charter, preamble. 
99  W Ncube (n 88). 
100  Ibid. 
101  Ibid. 
102  Ibid 26. 
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Children’s Charter that is not only situated within current debates in human rights but 
also reflective of the impact of context in the pursuit of universal rights.  
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